

THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Political Science 857
Fall 2019
Wednesday 1:20-3:15 PM
422 North Hall

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Office hours: Monday 1:00-3:00pm

Course overview

This course is a graduate-level review of the subfield of international relations within political science. It is intended primarily for first-year doctoral students in Political Science, although more advanced graduate students are also welcome. The primary purpose is to understand the development of the field, and to understand and be able to evaluate the main theoretical approaches in the sub-discipline. The course covers many of what have come to be known as classic works in the field, as well as some more recent theoretical and empirical applications. While it is not designed as a research course, it is useful preparation for more specialized courses of study emphasizing IR research. Another important purpose is to prepare PhD students in Political Science for the preliminary examination in international relations.

Throughout the course, we will focus primarily on alternative theoretical approaches and perspectives, although we will also explore some empirical work. Our goal will be to engage, discuss, and wrestle with the following questions: What do the authors want to explain? What are the critical concepts? How are cause and effect observed? What kind of research design is employed? From what theoretical perspective does the argument originate? With whom are the authors engaged in debate?

If you are planning to take International Relations as one of your prelim fields in the political science department, you should create a file or drive where you store the materials from your IR classes, including syllabi and papers that you write. This will make it easier to pull together the required materials for prelims at the end of your second year.

Course requirements

1. *Participation* (1/3 of total grade): All students should come to class having done the readings and prepared to discuss them in depth each week.
2. *Reading response papers* (1/3 of total grade): Each student will be required to write **seven short response papers** (no more than 2 pages) based on the weekly readings or some subset thereof. A copy of the essay should be emailed to me by noon the day before class. The papers should not just re-present the readings, but rather must analyze, compare, and/or critique the quality of the theory and/or evidence, as appropriate.

3. *Literature Review Essay* (1/3 of total grade): This should take a topic and survey the literature on it. You can start with the readings for one of the weeks, but should go well beyond them to cover newer, especially empirical, material. You can use this as an opportunity to review the literature related to a potential dissertation topic, if you are considering specializing in international relations, or simply as a chance to see what the state of the art is on a particular topic. The essays in the *Annual Review of Political Science* can be taken as models. Length should be around 5-7 thousand words.

All written work must have a title page including the title of the document, your name, the date, the name of the class, the professor's name, and the type of assignment it is, (weekly essay, final paper). The pages must be numbered. References are to be done with American Political Science Association (APSA) system. The last page in the document must be the reference list. For information on writing and formatting references, see the UW Writing Center website, particularly, their writer's handbook, where you can find information about proper citing and the APSA system.

<https://writing.wisc.edu/Handbook/DocAPSA.html>

The name of the document must be your last name, followed by numbers 1 through 7 for the weekly papers, and "Final" for the final paper, followed by the relevant document suffix. For instance, Smith's third discussion paper would be named Smith3.docx and Smith's final paper would be named SmithFinal.docx.

Readings

Nearly all of the articles are available online, either through public sources or UW's library. Other materials will be handled on an ad hoc basis.

For each reading, we will summarize the argument, discuss its contribution to IR, and probe the argument and evidence for strengths and weaknesses. The following questions are examples of the sorts of questions that can guide your reading of each piece and will shape our discussion:

- What is the question or puzzle?
- What is the argument?
- What are the explicit or implicit assumptions?
- Who are the relevant actors?
- What are their preferences and interests and where do they come from?
- At what level of analysis is the argument?
- Where does the argument fit into the theoretical landscape of IR and who would disagree?
- What is the relative importance of agency versus structure?
- What evidence is provided in support of the argument and is it convincing?

Course Schedule: Fall 2019

Week	Module	Topic	Date	Month
1	Some Classics	Before 1945	11	September
2		From 1945-1980	18	
3	Realism	Power	25	
4		Technology and Beliefs	2	
5	Liberalism	Domestic Institutions	9	October
6		Regime Type and Conflict	16	
7	Rational Choice	Bargaining	23	
8		Cooperation	30	
9	Constructivism and Psychology	Constructivism	6	November
10		Psychology	13	
11	IPE	Trade, Finance and Migration	20	
12		Thanksgiving	27	
13	International Institutions	Origins	4	December
14		Effects	11	
		Literature Review Due	18	

Module 1: Some Classics

Week 1 – Before 1945

- [Old Testament: Joshua 6](#)
- [Sun Tsu. *The Art of War*, §1-3.](#)
- [Thucydides. *The Peloponnesian War*, Book I, §1-23; Book III, §36-50; Book V §84-116.](#)
- [Pope Urban II. Speech at the Council of Clermont, 1095.](#)
- [Machiavelli. *The Prince*, Chapters 12-14, 18.](#)
- [Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan*. Chapter 13.](#)
- [Thomas Mun. 1694. *England's Treasure by Forraign Trade*, Chapters 2-7.](#)
- [Adam Smith. 1776. *The Wealth of Nations*, Book IV, Chapter 2.](#)
- [Immanuel Kant. *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*.](#)
- [Carl von Clausewitz. 1832. *On War*. Chapter 1.](#)
- Halford Mackinder. 1904. The Geographical Pivot of History. *The Geographical Journal* 170(4): 298-321.
- [Norman Angell. 1910. *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage*. Chapter 3.](#)
- [Friederich von Bernhardi. 1912. *Germany and the Next War*, Chapter 1.](#)
- [Lenin, V. I. 1916. *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. Chapter 7.](#)
- Vitalis, Robert. 2010. The Noble American Science of Imperial Relations and Its Laws of Race Development. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 52(4): 909-938.

Week 2 –From 1945 to 1980

- Edward H. Carr. 1946. *The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939*. Chapter 5.
- Morgenthau, Hans. 1948. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3-13 (Ch. I, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm>.)
- Butterfield, Herbert. 1950. The Tragic Element in Modern International Conflict. *Review of Politics*, 12(2): 147-164.
- Thomas Schelling. 1960. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Chapters 3, 8.
- Singer, J. David. 1961. The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations. *World Politics* 14(1): 77-92.
- Hedley Bull. 1977. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. Chapters 1 and 2.
- Robert Jervis. 1977. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Chapter 3.
- Jervis, Robert 1978. Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. *World Politics* 30(2): 167-214.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Waveland. Chapters 6-8.
- Peter Alexis Gourevitch, 1978. “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics.” *International Organization* 32(4): 881-912.

Module 2: Realism

Week 3 – The Balance of Power, Alliances and Preventive War

- Stephen M. Walt. 1985. Alliance Formation and The Balance of Power. *International Security* 9(4): 3-43.
- Schweller, Randall. 1996. Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In. *International Security* 19(1): 72-107.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. Norton. Chapters 1, 2, 5.
- Robert Gilpin, 1981. *War and Change in International Politics*. pp. 9-49, 85-105.
- Copeland, Dale. 2000. *The Origins of Major War*. Cornell University Press. Chapters 1-4.

Week 4 –The Security Dilemma, Technology and Beliefs

- Van Evera, Stephen. 1998. Offense, Defense and the Causes of War. *International Security*. 22(4): 5-43.
- Lieber, Keir A. Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security. *International Security*, 2000, 25(1): 71-104.
- Jervis, Robert. 1990. *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon*. Cornell University Press. Chapter 1.
- Keir Lieber and Daryl Press. 2006. The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of US Primacy. *International Security* 30(4): 7-44.
- Kydd, Andrew. 2005. *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*. Princeton University Press. Chapters 1-4.
- Rosato, Sebastian. 2014. The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers. *International Security* 39(3): 48-88.

Module 3: Liberalism

Week 5 – Domestic Institutions

- Andrew Moravcsik, 1997. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” *International Organization*, vol. 51(4): 513-553
- Robert Putnam. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” *International Organization* 42(3): 427-460.
- Snyder, Jack. 1991. *Myths of Empire*. Cornell University Press. Chapters 1-4.
- Lisa Martin. 2000. *Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Commitments*. Chapters. 2 (21-52) & 7 (165-190).
- Saunders, Elizabeth. 2017. No Substitute for Experience: Presidents, Advisors and Information in Group Decision Making. *International Organization* 71(S1): S219-S247.

Week 6 – Regime Type and Conflict

- Lake, David A. 1992. Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War. *American Political Science Review* 86: 24-37.
- Desch, Michael C. 2002. Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters. *International Security* 27(2): 5-47.
- Mansfield, Edward and Jack Snyder. 1995. Democratization and the Danger of War. *International Security* 20(1): 5-38.
- Narang, Vipin and Rebecca Nelson. 2009. Who Are These Belligerent Democratizers? Reassessing the Impact of Democratization on War. *International Organization* 63:357-359.
- Kenneth Schultz, 1999. “Do Domestic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War.” *International Organization*, 53(2): 233-266.
- Downes, Alexander B and Todd S. Sechser. 2012. The Illusion of Democratic Credibility. *International Organization* 66(3): 457-489.
- Weeks, Jessica. 2008. Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve. *International Organization* 62(1): 35-64.

Module 4: Rational Choice

Week 7 – Bargaining

- Fearon, James D. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War.” *International Organization* 49(3): 379-414.
- Powell, Robert. 1996. Stability and the Distribution of Power. *World Politics* 48(1): 239-267.
- Fearon, James D. 1997 Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(1): 68-90.
- Trager, Robert F. 2010. Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters. *American Political Science Review* 104(2): 347-368.
- Mark Fey and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2011. Uncertainty and Incentives in Crisis Bargaining: Game Free Analysis of International Conflict. *American Journal of Political Science* 55(1): 149-169.

Week 8 – Cooperation

- Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books. Chapters 1-4 (3-87).
- Grieco, Joseph. 1988. Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. *International Organization* 42: 485-507.
- Powell, Robert. 1991. Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations. *American Political Science Review* 85(4): 1303-1320.
- Fearon, James D. 1998. “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation.” *International Organization* 52(2): 269-306
- Signorino, Curtis S. 1996. Simulating International Cooperation under Uncertainty. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 40(1): 152-205.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 2010. The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate Conflict over Rebel Support in Civil Wars. *International Organization* 64(2): 281-312.

Module 5: Constructivism and Psychology

Week 9: Constructivism

- Wendt, Alexander. 1992. Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization* 46(2): 391-425.
- Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organization* 52(4): 887-917.
- Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2001. The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. *International Organization* 55(1): 47-80.
- Barnett, Michael and Raymond Duvall. 2005. Power in International Politics. *International Organization* 59(1): 39-75.
- Tannewald, Nina. 2005. Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo. *International Security* 29(4): 5-49.
- Shelf, Nadav. 2016. Unequal Ground: Homelands and Conflict. *International Organization* 70(1): 33-63.

Week 10: Psychology

- Jack S. Levy. 1997. "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly* 41(1): 87-112.
- Sell, Aaron, John Tooby and Leah Cosmides. 2009. Formidability and the Logic of Human Anger. *PNAS* 106(35):15073-15078.
- Renshon, Jonathan. 2015. Losing Face and Sinking Costs: Experimental Evidence on the Judgement of Political and Military Leaders. *International Organization* 69(3): 659-695.
- Horowitz, Michael and Allan Stam. 2014. How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders. *International Organization* 68(3): 527-559.
- Mellers, et al. 2014. Psychological Strategies for Winning a Geopolitical Forecasting Tournament. *Psychological Science* 25(5): 1106-1115.

Module 6: International Political Economy

Week 11 – Trade, Finance and Immigration

- Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade." *American Political Science Review* 81(4): 1121-1137.
- Gowa, Joanne S. and Edward D. Mansfield. 1993. "Power Politics and International Trade," *American Political Science Review* 87(2): 408-20.
- Hiscox, Michael J. 2002. Commerce, Coalitions and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation. *American Political Science Review* 96(3): 593-608.
- Mansfield, Edward and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. Support for Free Trade: Self Interest, Sociotropic Politics and Out-Group Anxiety. *International Organization* 63(3): 425-457.
- Jeffrey Frieden. 1991. "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of International Finance." *International Organization* 45:4 (Autumn), pp. 425-451.
- Layna Mosley. 2000. "Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States." *International Organization* 54: 4 (Autumn), pp. 737-74.
- Hainmueller, Jens and Michael J. Hiscox. 2007. Educated Preferences: Explaining Individual Attitudes toward Immigration in Europe. *International Organization* 61(3): 755-780.
- Peters, Margaret E. 2014. Trade, Foreign Direct Investment and Immigration Policymaking in the United States. *International Organization* 68(4): 811-844.

Module 7: International Institutions

Week 13: Origins

- Krasner, Stephen D. 1982. Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables. *International Organization* 36(2): 185-205.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1982. The Demand for Regimes. *International Organization* 36(2): 325-255.
- David A. Lake. 1996. "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations." *International Organization* 50(1): 1-34.
- Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, "The Rational Design of International Institutions." *International Organization* (Autumn 2001): 761-800.
- Helen Milner and Peter Rosendorff. 2001. "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions; Uncertainty and Escape." *International Organization* 55: 829-858.

Week 14 - Effects

- John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49.
- Gheciu, Alexandra. 2005. Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the 'New Europe.' *International Organization* 59(4): 973-1012.
- Jana von Stein. 2005. "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance." *American Political Science Review* 99(4): 611-622.
- Copelovitch, Mark. 2010. Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending. *International Studies Quarterly* 54(1): 49-77.
- Busch, Marc L. and Krzysztof J. Pelc. 2010. The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization. *International Organization* 64(): 257-79.