



Political Science 853, Fall 2019

Comparative Political Institutions

Thursday, 1:20-3:15, 422 North Hall

Nils Ringe

201B North Hall, ringe@wisc.edu

Office Hours: Thursday 3:30-4:30 and by appointment

Course Description: This class examines the roles that a wide range of political institutions play in different parts of the world, in both theoretical and empirical terms.

The first part of the course covers a series of theoretical and conceptual approaches to the study of institutions in Political Science. In this section we will address questions like: What are institutions? What functions do they fulfill? How and why are they created? How do they relate to individual preferences and behaviors?

Next, we take a more nuanced view and investigate differences between formal and informal institutions, between institutions in democratic and non-democratic regimes, and between institutions and social networks.

Finally, we focus on the empirical study of a particular set of institutions that are closely related to each other: electoral systems, party systems, political parties, and legislatures. Our goals for this part of the class are three-fold: first, to learn about particular institutional arrangements, how they are connected, how they function, and how they affect political processes and outcomes; second, to gain familiarity with some of the key pieces of research on each subject; and finally, to tie these empirical studies to the theoretical premises laid out in the first part of the class.

This is a 3 credit, graduate class. The credit hours are met during one weekly 115 minute face-to-face class meeting and a minimum of 230 additional minutes spent preparing ahead of time and working on the class assignments.

Over the course of the semester, you will become familiar with different institutional theories and their application, as well as examples of research using an institutionalist lense. You will

also relate and apply the materials to your own area of interest by writing a research paper or research design (details below) as your final project for the course.

Assignments:

1. Completing your readings (all of which are available on our Canvas course website), regular attendance, and active participation in class.
2. Weekly response/discussion papers (2-3 double-spaced pages max.) on the readings. In these papers, I am not looking for summaries of the readings, but for thoughtful engagement with the material. At the end, please include 2-3 discussion questions. The grade for these papers will be the average of the ten best grades, meaning that you may turn in as many discussion papers as you want, but a minimum of ten if you want full credit. Missing discussion papers will be graded as failed, and you may *not* skip any of the papers on the readings for weeks 2-5. Discussion papers are due to me via email at 11am on the day before our class meeting.
3. Short development paper (9-12 pages): by October 24, you will prepare a short paper that takes the required readings as a point of departure and develops a research agenda and/or a preliminary empirical investigation focusing on your area of interest. This assignment is a first step toward your final paper.
4. Final paper (25-30 pages): for your final paper, you will either write an original research paper or a carefully constructed research design. This paper is due on Saturday, December 14, 2019.
 - a. *Original research paper*: ideally, I would like for you to write complete research papers that you could present at a professional conference or send out to a journal. Note that I am open to letting you further develop a work in progress, as long as it is explicitly concerned with political institutions and/or adopts an institutionalist perspective. If you want to take this route, please come see me as soon as possible to discuss your project.
 - b. *Research design*: you may write a research design as your final paper, ideally with the intent to actually conduct the necessary research at a later point in time. Again, this research would have to be concerned with political institutions and/or adopt an institutionalist perspective.

Please think of this assignment as more than a mere “term paper” with little relevance for your careers and view it as an opportunity for your professional development. You should aim for every paper you write in a Political Science Ph.D. program to become a conference paper or a published article. This class will be a good place to start, continue, or finalize such a project.

Grading:

Participation:	20%
Weekly response papers:	20%
Short development paper:	20%
Final paper:	40%

Diversity and Inclusion: Diversity is a source of strength, creativity, and innovation for UW-Madison. We value the contributions of each person and respect the profound ways their identity, culture, background, experience, status, abilities, and opinion enrich the university community. We commit ourselves to the pursuit of excellence in teaching, research, outreach, and diversity as inextricably linked goals. The University of Wisconsin-Madison fulfills its public mission by creating a welcoming and inclusive community for people from every background – people who as students, faculty, and staff serve Wisconsin and the world. <https://diversity.wisc.edu/>

Academic Integrity: By virtue of enrollment, each student agrees to uphold the high academic standards of the University of Wisconsin-Madison; academic misconduct is behavior that negatively impacts the integrity of the institution. Cheating, fabrication, plagiarism, unauthorized collaboration, and helping others commit these previously listed acts are examples of misconduct which may result in disciplinary action. Examples of disciplinary action include, but is not limited to, failure on the assignment/course, written reprimand, disciplinary probation, suspension, or expulsion. <https://conduct.students.wisc.edu/syllabus-statement/>

Accommodations for Students with Disabilities: The University of Wisconsin-Madison supports the right of all enrolled students to a full and equal educational opportunity. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Wisconsin State Statute (36.12), and UW-Madison policy (Faculty Document 1071) require that students with disabilities be reasonably accommodated in instruction and campus life. Reasonable accommodations for students with disabilities is a shared faculty and student responsibility. Students are expected to inform faculty [me] of their need for instructional accommodations by the end of the third week of the semester, or as soon as possible after a disability has been incurred or recognized. Faculty [I], will work either directly with the student [you] or in coordination with the McBurney Center to identify and provide reasonable instructional accommodations. Disability information, including instructional accommodations as part of a student's educational record, is confidential and protected under FERPA. <https://mcburney.wisc.edu/instructor/>

September 5: What Are Institutions? Old Institutionalism – New Institutionalism.

Peters, B. Guy. 1996. "Political Institutions Old and New." In: Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.): *A New Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.

March, James G. and Johan P Olsen. 1984. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life." *American Political Science Review* 78(3), 734-749.

Hall, Peter A. and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. 1996. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." *Political Studies* 44, 936-957.

North, Douglas. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 1.

Przeworski, Adam. 2004. "Institutions Matter?" *Government and Opposition* 39(4), 527-540.

September 12: Rational Choice Institutionalism.

Levi, Margaret. 1997. "A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis." In Lichbach, Mark Irving and Alan S. Zuckerman (eds.): *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 19-41.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1989. "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1(2), 131-148.

Tsebelis, George. 1990. "In Defense of the Rational Choice Approach. In: Tsebelis, George: *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 18-51.

Riker, William H. 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 74(2), 432-446.

Tsebelis, George. 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism." *British Journal of Political Science* 25(3), 289-325.

Bates, Robert H. et al. 1998. *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998. Read Introduction (pp. 3-22).

Greif, Avner and David D. Laitin. 2004. "A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change." *American Political Science Review* 98(4), 633-652.

September 19: Sociological, Normative, and Discursive Institutionalism.

DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter W. Powell. 1991. "Introduction." In: DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter W. Powell (eds.): *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1-40.

Jepperson, Ronald L. 1991. "Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism." In: DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter W. Powell (eds.): *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 143-163.

March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen (2006): "The Logic of Appropriateness." In: Moran, Michael, Martin Rein, and Robert E. Goodin (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press). (Also available at ARENA Working Paper WP 04/09)

Meyer, J. and B. Rowan. 1977. "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony." *The American Journal of Sociology* 83(2), 340-363.

Schmidt, Vivien A. 2008. "Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11, 303-326.

September 26: Historical Institutionalism.

Hall, Peter A. and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. 1998. "The Potential of Historical Institutionalism." *Political Studies* 46(5), 958-962.

Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, 369-404.

Mahoney, James and Kathleen Thelen. 2010. *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 1

Pierson, Paul. 2000. "The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change." *Governance* 13(4), 475-99.

Pierson, Paul. 1996. "The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutional Perspective." *Comparative Political Studies* 29(2), 123-163.

October 3: Crossing the Line (or trying to...)

Weyland, Kurt 2008. "Toward a New Theory of Institutional Change." *World Politics* 60(2), 281-314.

Rodden, Jonathan. 2009. "Back to the Future: Endogenous Institutions and Comparative Politics," In: Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (eds.), *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*. Cambridge University Press.

Greif, Avner. 2006. *Institutions and the Path to a Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade*. Cambridge University Press, chs. 1, 2.

Weingast, Barry R. 2005. "Persuasion, Preference Change, and Critical Junctures: The Microfoundations of a Macroscopic Concept," In: Ira Katznelson and Barry R. Weingast (eds.): *Preferences and Situations: Points of Contact between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalisms*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Capoccia, Giovanni and R. Daniel Kelemen. 2007. "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism." *World Politics* 59(3), 341-369.

October 10: Informal Institutions.

Helmke, Gretchen and Steven Levitsky. 2004. "Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda." *Perspectives on Politics* 2(4), 725-740.

Farrell, Henry and Adrienne Héritier. 2003. "Formal and Informal Institutions Under Codecision: Continuous Constitution-Building in Europe." *Governance* 16(4), 577-600.

Tsai, Lily S. 2007. *Accountability without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China*. New York: Cambridge University Press, ch. 1 and ch. 5 or ch. 6.

Darden, Keith. 2008. "The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State Institution." *Politics & Society* 36(1), 35-60.

Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2010. "The Best Laid Plans: The Impact of Informal Rules on Formal Institutions in Transitional Regimes." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 45(3), 311-333.

October 17: Political Institutions in Non-Democratic Regimes.

Thomas Pepinsky. 2013. "The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism." *British Journal of Political Science*, FirstView Article, August 2013, pp 1-23.

Bunce, Valerie. 1999. *Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State*. New York: Cambridge University Press, chs. 1-2.

Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press, *Introduction*.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. New York: Cambridge University Press, *Introduction*.

Boix, Carles and Milan W. Svoblik. 2013. "The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships." *Journal of Politics* 75(2), 300-316

Wright, Joseph and Abel Escribà-Folch. 2011. "Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival: Transitions to Democracy and Subsequent Autocracy." *British Journal of Political Science* 42, 283-309

October 24: Institutions and Social Networks.

Patterson, Samuel C. 1959. "Patterns of Interpersonal Relations in a State Legislative Group: The Wisconsin Assembly." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 23, 101–9.

Heinz, John P., Edward O. Laumann, Robert H. Salisbury, and Robert L. Nelson. 1990. "Inner Circles or Hollow Cores? Elite Networks in National Policy Systems." *Journal of Politics* 52, 356–90.

Feiock, Richard C., and John T. Scholz. 2010. "Self-organizing governance of institutional collective action dilemmas: an overview." In: Richard C. Feiock and John T. Scholz (eds.): *Self-Organizing Federalism: Collaborative Mechanisms to Mitigate Institutional Collective Action Dilemmas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Masket, Seth E. 2008. "Where You Sit Is Where You Stand: The Impact of Seating Proximity on Legislative Cue-Taking." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3, 301-11.

Ringe, Nils and Jennifer Nicoll Victor. 2013. "*Bridging the Information Gap: Legislative Member Organizations as Social Networks in the United States and the European Union*," (with Christopher J. Carman), University of Michigan Press, ch. 2.

Larson, Jennifer M. 2017. "Why the West Became Wild: Informal Governance with Incomplete Networks." *World Politics* 69(4), 713-749

October 31: Electoral Systems (class to be rescheduled; I'm traveling...)

Cox, Gary W. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chs. 1, 2.

Boix, Carles. 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 93(3), 609-624.

Leeman, Lucas and Isabela Mares. 2014. "The Adoption of Proportional Representation." *Journal of Politics* 76(2), 461-478.

Benoit, Kenneth. 2007. "Electoral Laws as Political Consequences: Explaining the Origins and Change of Electoral Institutions" *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10: 363-390.

Shvetsova, Olga. 2003. "Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects." *Constitutional Political Economy* 14: 191-212

Bol, Damien, Jean-Benoit Pilet, and Pedro Riera. 2015. "The international diffusion of electoral systems: The spread of mechanisms tempering proportional representation across Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 54, 384–410.

November 7: Party Systems.

Raymond, Christopher D. 2015. "In defiance of Duverger: The class cleavage and the emergence of district-level multiparty systems in western Europe." *Research and Politics*, January-March 2015: 1–8

Casal Bértoa, Fernando. 2017. "It's Been Mostly About Money! A Multi-method Research Approach to the Sources of Institutionalization." *Sociological Methods and Research* 46(4), 683–714

Kreuzer, Marcus. 2009. "How Party Systems Form: Path Dependency and the Institutionalization of the Post-War German Party System." *British Journal of Political Science* 39(4), 669-697.

Casal Bértoa, Fernando and Till Weber. 2019. "Restrained Change: Party Systems in Times of Economic Crisis." *Journal of Politics* 81(1), 233-245.

Dinas, Elias and Pedro Riera. 2018. "Do European Parliament Elections Impact National Party System Fragmentation?" *Comparative Political Studies* 51(4) 447–476.

Mudde, Cas. 2014. "Fighting the system? Populist radical right parties and party system change." *Party Politics* 20(2) 217–226

Cox, Gary W., Jon H. Fiva, and Daniel M. Smith. 2019. "Parties, Legislators, and the Origins of Proportional Representation." *Comparative Political Studies* 52(1), 102–133

November 14: Political Parties (visitor: Jae-Jae Spoon, University of Pittsburgh)

Dalton, Russell J. and Martin P. Wattenberg (eds.). 2002. *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. New York: Oxford University Press, ch. 1.

Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair. 2009. "The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement." *Perspectives on Politics* 7(4), 753-766.

Van Biezen, Ingrid. 2012. "Constitutionalizing Party Democracy: The Constitutive Codification of Political Parties in Post-war Europe." *British Journal of Political Science* 42(1), 187-212.

Spoon, Jae-Jae and Heike Klüver. 2019. "Party convergence and vote switching: Explaining mainstream party decline across Europe." *European Journal of Political Research*.

Lupu, Noam and Rachel Beatty Riedl. 2012. Political Parties and Uncertainty in Developing Democracies. *Comparative Political Studies* 46(11), 1339–1365

Samuels, David J. 2002. Presidentialized Parties: The Separation of Powers and Party Organization and Behavior. *Comparative Political Studies* 35(4), 461-483.

Klüver, Heike and Jae-Jae Spoon. 2016. "Who Responds? Voters, Parties and Issue Attention." *British Journal of Political Science* 46(3), 633-654.

November 21: Legislatures.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 1981. "Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice." *Public Choice* 37(3), 503-519.

Cox, Gary W. 2000. "On the Effects of Legislative Rules." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 25(2), 169-192.

Binder, Sarah A. 2003. *Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock*. Washington, DC: Brookings, ch. 2.

Cox, Gary W. and Matthew D. McCubbins. 1993. "Introduction." In: Cox, Gary W. and Matthew D. McCubbins: *Legislative Leviathan*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1-15.

Mattson, Ingvar and Kaare Strom. 2004. "Committee Effects on Legislation." In: Döring, Herbert and Mark Hallerberg (eds.): *Patterns of Parliamentary Behavior*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.

Ringe, Nils. 2010. *Who Decides and How? Preferences, Uncertainty, and Policy Choice in the European Parliament*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, ch. 2.

December 5: Paper Presentations