The Global Impact of Quotas: On the Fast Track to Increased Female Legislative Representation

Aili Mari Tripp and Alice Kang

In the early 1990s, Uganda was one of the few countries in Africa to have adopted legislative quotas to increase the representation of women. But after the 1995 United Nations Conference on Women in Beijing, country after country adopted gender quotas in Africa and elsewhere. This resulted in dramatic changes in political landscapes almost overnight in many countries. Rwanda, for example, claimed the highest percentage of female parliamentarians in the world with 49% of its legislative seats being held by women after 2003.

It soon became apparent that the older explanations that had been used to account for women’s legislative representation were outdated and needed to be reconsidered in light of these new trends. We decided to investigate these new global trends to see to what degree these institutional measures contributed to female legislative representation, compared to other factors.

We were in for several big surprises. Not only did we discover that the introduction of quotas offers the most explanatory power for women’s representation today,

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The Evolution of the National Party Conventions

Byron Shafer

Once every four years, I skip the annual convention of the American Political Science Association and go instead to the quadrennial conventions of the American Democratic and Republican Parties. For me, this constitutes fieldwork of the old-fashioned sort, and as I write this (September 7, 2008), I am just back from staying with the New Jersey delegation among the Democrats in Denver and with the Wisconsin delegation among the Republicans in Minneapolis-St. Paul. By now—I have gone to both conventions in every year beginning in 1980—such visits also constitute ‘old home week’ with a set of reporters and analysts who likewise reliably turn up for these quadrennial events.

The 2008 conventions were especially good at reminding anyone who is interested in partisan politics in the United States, for which national party conventions are the sole, purely partisan, national institution, how much that institution has changed within the conscious memory of many readers of this newsletter. I shall say something about this long-run change below.

- continued on page 10
Who’s New in North Hall?

In August 2008, we had the pleasure of welcoming Professor Lisa Martin and Associate Professor John Zumbrunnen to the Department, adding more depth in International Relations and Political Theory.

Professor Lisa Martin

Lisa Martin received her Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1989, and moved to Madison in 2008 after teaching at Harvard for 16 years. Her research is primarily focused on the role of institutions and international organizations in world politics. Professor Martin views institutions through a strategic lens, examining how their functions and design influence state interaction. Topics that she has worked on include economic sanctions and the role of domestic legislatures in international cooperation. Her current research interests include examination of the signaling and commitment properties of international institutions; comparative analysis of the international financial institutions; and the application of political economy models of trade to trade in services. Professor Martin served as editor-in-chief of the journal *International Organization* from 2002-2006. She has published two books with Princeton University Press as well as a number of edited volumes. Her research has also been published in *International Organization*, *World Politics*, *International Security*, and *International Studies Quarterly*.

Associate Professor John Zumbrunnen

John Zumbrunnen joins the Political Science department after 8 years teaching political theory at Union College in Schenectady, New York. Zumbrunnen earned his B.S. in political science at Missouri State University and his Ph.D. at the University of Minnesota. His research and teaching interests range throughout the field of political theory, but focus on Greek political thought, contemporary democratic theory, and American political thought. Zumbrunnen’s essays have appeared in *Polity*, *History of Political Thought*, *Political Theory* and the *American Political Science Review*, as well as in edited volumes. In July 2008, Penn State University Press published his book, *Silence and Democracy: Athenian Politics in Thucydides’ History*. Current projects include a book-length study of the plays of the Greek comic poet Aristophanes, focusing on the playwright’s portrayal of ordinary citizens struggling against elite domination of nominally democratic politics, along with ongoing work on the place of conservatism and populism in contemporary American political thought.
Welcome from Madison and historic North Hall. This has been an exciting year for the Department.

We continue to be a leading force in the University’s undergraduate mission. In 2007-08, we had about 4,600 students enrolled in our courses in each semester and were again the largest major in the College of Letters and Science.

The chart accompanying this article shows the ebb and flow in the number of majors over time. Some of the fluctuations are no doubt due to dramatic world events. The increase in the late 1980s and early 1990s coincides with the remarkable fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of democracy in Eastern Europe. Our number of majors then dropped for four years starting in 1992-93. I’m not sure if this qualifies as a dramatic world event, but that happens to be my first year on the faculty at UW. I’ll have to assume that the decline in majors after that is just an awkward coincidence.

We saw a jump of over 25% in the number of majors in the academic year after the attacks of 9/11. Other reasons are less dramatic, such as changes in other majors that might make it more or less difficult for some students to add political science as a second major.

Just how significant our teaching contribution is to the College’s educational enterprise can also be seen in the chart. Nearly 10 percent of the students in the College of Letters and Science leave with a degree from the Political Science Department in the form of either a Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Science degree. Eventually, if past trends hold and we project to the future, we will account for 131% of all the undergraduate majors, though the statisticians in the Department keep insisting this is impossible.

Regardless of the ups and downs in the number of majors, our number is always large, a testament to the inherent interest of the subject matter, the applicability of skills learned in political science classes to a wide range of career pursuits, and the quality of the Department’s teaching and research. The Department has always been proud of its teaching and research strength. Two of our faculty, David Canon and Edward Friedman, were honored this past year with campus-wide Distinguished Teaching Awards. About one quarter of our current faculty have now received these highly competitive awards—a truly remarkable statement of the seriousness with which teaching is regarded here.

This teaching prowess builds off great success in research. Political Science faculty had a terrific year in earning major honors and awards. One sign of our level of accomplishment is that Professors Barry Burden, Aili Tripp, and affiliate faculty member Dhavan Shah won three of the inaugural ten Hamel Faculty Fellow awards granted by the College of Letters and Science. These awards, funded by a generous gift to the College, were open to all programs and departments. A list of our award winners appears elsewhere in this newsletter.

The Department is fortunate this year to add two new faculty to its roster. Professor Lisa Martin joins us from Harvard University and is a specialist in International Relations. Professor John Zumbrunnen arrives from Union College with a focus on Political Theory. Another new faculty member, Katja Favretto, is doing postdoctoral research at Yale University this year and will join us in Fall 2009 and add more strength to our International Relations group. And I am delighted to report that Professor Jon Pevehouse, also an International Relations expert, will be rejoining the Department in Fall 2009 after two years at the University of Chicago.

As the list of award winners shows, our graduate and undergraduate students also landed significant honors this past year. Several graduate students won awards for their research and teaching, and seventeen earned their Ph.D. in the 2007-08 academic year. Our graduate program is among the most highly ranked in the country. We annually receive about 250 applications for the roughly 15-20 open slots in an entering class. The Department’s reputation has a global reach, which is evident in the one-third of our graduate applicant pool that comes from outside the United States.

One reason for the success of our undergraduates in awards and scholarships is their ability to develop skills while conducting research with faculty members. Consider just two examples.
The annual summer Sophomore Honors Research Apprenticeship program allows a student to work with a faculty member on that professor’s research. Students assist in the research process and are responsible for giving a presentation on the research. Political Science is routinely the department with the most students participating in the program. The second example is the Hilldale Research Award. This competitive grant program allows undergraduates to pursue their research interest with a faculty member’s guidance. Again, Political Science is traditionally very well represented in this competition.

Programs like the Hilldale Research Award result from the generosity of alumni. As the Department Chair, I can tell you firsthand that your gifts to the Department make a huge difference in what we can do for students and to advance research. Gifts from alumni allow the Department to support an array of extracurricular opportunities for students and have helped us add new scholarships for undergraduates and new fellowships for graduate students. They have allowed us to bring in top experts from around the world to give talks in our various speakers series. Award-winning and cutting-edge faculty research are furthered by your generosity, and your gifts help us recruit and retain excellent faculty. It is a cliché you have heard before, but I can verify that it is absolutely true that a gift of any size is received with great appreciation and has tremendous impact.

In these difficult economic times, I want to thank you all for being such great friends of the Department. Please see the form at the back of this newsletter for ways you can help the Department and its students, or visit us at www.polisci.wisc.edu and click on the “Alumni” link or the “Give a Gift” button. Your support has a major impact. I am delighted to send you this newsletter and hope I will hear from you (coleman@polisci.wisc.edu) with memories of your experiences here and ideas on how the Department can grow even stronger.

The Ph.D. Cohort Challenge

The Cohort Challenge is an effort initiated and organized by two of our recent Ph.D.s, Shawn Boyne and Jennifer Ziemke. The challenge is a competition between recent entering Ph.D. cohorts (1997 through 2001) for donations dedicated for graduate student support. After the Challenge was announced, an anonymous faculty member stepped forward to offer up to a $1,000 match for the cohort raising the most funds, and an anonymous emeritus faculty member offered the same match. The Department is so grateful to the Wisconsin Ph.D.s who are doing all the legwork on this effort, as well as our anonymous donors and those in the various cohorts who have provided gifts.

Through November 17:

- The class of 1998 leads with the highest participation rate, with the class of 1997 in second
- The class of 2001 leads with the largest amount of funds contributed, with the class of 1998 in second

The competition continues through December 31!
New Members of the Political Science Board of Visitors

Jeff Lyons

Formerly the president of Charles Schwab’s $400 billion asset management business, Jeffrey Lyons now focuses his energy on community involvement and board service.

Who was your favorite professor?

I’d have to say my favorite professor was Henry Hart. I thoroughly enjoyed his course on American politics. He brought great insights to the practice of political campaigns and campaigning and was an incredibly nice man.

What are some of your fondest memories of UW?

I had so many fond memories of UW that it’s hard to identify just a few. At the top of the list were the many life-long friends that I met. My freshman year I lived in Ogg Hall and thereafter in houses in a variety of neighborhoods across Madison.

How did your Political Science degree play a role in your career?

I started my career as a marketing analyst. The most direct way political science impacted my career was through classes that improved my analytic skills and the ability to interpret and gain insights from data. Those analytic skills were invaluable as my career in business progressed.

What’s the hardest thing for you to explain to your parents about something that happened at UW?

The hardest things to explain to my parents are not fit to print in this newsletter. But one of the printable was that I took an incomplete in a class my last semester at the UW and technically did not graduate at the time of the graduation ceremony. I did complete the paper for the course and years later did tell my parents.

David Tabacoff

David Tabacoff is the Executive Producer of the O’Reilly Factor and the Radio Factor for Fox News.

Who was your favorite professor?

My best-remembered Political Science professors were Booth Fowler and Ed Friedman. Professor Fowler was probably the professor I came to know best. In part, thanks to his constructive critique of my masters thesis on New Zealand politics, an article based on my work was published in New Zealand Politics: A Reader, edited by Professor Stephen Levin of Victoria University of Wellington.

What are some of your fondest memories of UW?

Being a naive and political young freshman heading to class running headlong into the Dow Chemical protests of October of 1967 is not something one easily forgets. I’m afraid much of the time school took a back seat to protest. But the entire undergraduate experience at the university was something I have always treasured. I met my wife in Madison, one of my three children graduated from UW, and a second is a sophomore there.

What does Bill O’Reilly think about you having received your degree from UW-Madison?

As for Bill, I would say he sometimes takes guilty pleasure when he sees something the University does to draw his ire. Thankfully, we have only done one or two stories based on controversies involving the university. But overall, he can’t argue with the UW’s prestige and, as a football fan, has to listen to me boast about the team’s success.
AN AWARD-WINNING YEAR

Department of Political Science Award Winners, Summer 2007 through October 2008

FACULTY

Barry Burden: Hamel Faculty Fellow, University of Wisconsin, College of Letters and Science.

David Canon: Chancellor’s Distinguished Teaching Award.


Edward Friedman: Chancellor’s Distinguished Teaching Award.

Ken Goldstein: Kellett Mid-Career Award, University of Wisconsin Graduate School.


Byron Shafer (with Richard Johnston), Best Book Award, Race, Ethnicity and Politics Section, APSA, for The End of Southern Exceptionalism: Class, Race, and Partisan Change in the Postwar South. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006). This book also won the V.O. Key Prize of the Southern Political Science Association for the outstanding book of the year on southern politics.


Hamel Faculty Fellow, University of Wisconsin, College of Letters and Science.

Scott Straus: Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 2007 for The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda. This book also won an Honorable Mention, Melville Herskovits Award, African Studies Association, for the most important book on African studies published in the previous year.

Vilas Associate Award, UW Graduate School.

Aili Tripp: Hamel Faculty Fellow, University of Wisconsin, College of Letters and Science.

Susan Yackee: Emerging Scholar Award-2007, Political Organizations and Parties Section, APSA, given to a scholar within seven years of the Ph.D. whose career to date demonstrates unusual promise.


Paul A. Volcker Endowment for Public Service Research and Education Award, Public Administration Section, APSA, 2008, given to a junior scholar researching public administration issues affecting governance in the United States and abroad.

David Weimer: Named a Fellow-Elect of the National Academy of Public Administration.
**STAFF**

*Liane Kosaki:* L&S Academic Staff Advising Award.

**GRADUATE STUDENTS**

*Tim Bagshaw:* L&S Teaching Fellow.


*Alice Kang:* Winner of the 2008 Alice Paul Dissertation Prospectus Award, awarded by the Women’s Caucus for Political Science: “The Political Basis of Women’s Rights in the Sahel.”

*Jen Ziemke:* Innovation in Teaching Award, a UW campus-wide TA award.

**UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS**


*Andrew Gordon:* Phillip Schemel Award (scholarship, Department).

*Kelly German Kuschel:* University League Scholarship (L&S).

*Adam Gordon Lichtenheld:* Leo and Jean Besozzi Scholarship (L&S).

*Katherine Blom Lininger:* Ralph B. Abrams Scholarship (L&S).

*Erika Lopez-Tapia:* Vera Elliot Scholarship (Department).

*Ryan Andrew Miller:* Jane Goddard Scholarship (L&S).

*Ben Pasquale:* Elaine Davis Prize (Department).

*Jeffrey Alan Wright:* Truman Scholarship (national competition).
In the fall of 2007, the Wisconsin Roosevelt Institution—a non-profit, non-partisan student think tank that conducts research on pressing policy issues—hosted a national energy conference, co-sponsored by the UW-Madison Department of Political Science through alumni donations, to connect students with private and public sector leaders in energy policy. The forum took place in the Wisconsin State Capitol and Monona Terrace Community and Convention Center and was intended to provide current and future policy leaders with insight into the fundamentals of creating energy policy on the state and national levels.

The conference was kicked off by former UW-Madison Chancellor and co-sponsor John Wiley and included distinguished commentators from the academic, commercial, political, and social realms who critiqued student proposals on a range of energy issues. More than 300 students from Wisconsin and all regions of the country packed the State Senate, Supreme Court and Assembly chambers, allowing standing room only.

The Roosevelt Institution is a national network of campus-based student think tanks that research issues facing our world, from environmental protection to equality under the law to trade and taxes. The founders of the Roosevelt Institution, a collection of students from Yale, Stanford, UW-Madison, and Middlebury, conceived their model to find avenues for youth to make contributions to policy development while enriching their community in ways that would help them to develop professionally and affect real change in American politics. These founding members recognized the need for a student voice in the policymaking process, from the genesis of ideas in academia to their implementation through local, state, and national governments. Since its inception, the Roosevelt Institution has ballooned to almost 7,000 student members nationwide. Together, these students publish numerous policy and research journals, advance dozens of legislative goals, and hold countless meetings, panels, and conferences every year.

Max Harris Brunner graduated with a degree in Political Science in May 2008.

It started with practice. In the weeks before the competition, we would meet daily to research current events, think of arguments, and practice speaking. For us, Nationals represented the culmination of a year long effort. We had received a generous grant from the UW Political Science Department. from its alumni donations, and had spent the early part of the season recruiting members and building the team. Now we were focused on perfecting all the skills necessary for success.

Patrick Tricker and I had qualified for the National Parliamentary Debate Tournament in Colorado Springs and, as the UW’s first parliamentary debate team in decades, we planned to make a splash. Coming with us was our travel coordinator and driver Katrina Becker, and our judge, Nick Bubb.

Armed with our wits and enough caffeine to jumpstart a Hummer, we piled into our rental car and began the sixteen hour road trip to Colorado. Tired and crabby, we checked into our hotel early Thursday morning.

Parliamentary debate is a speaking event in which a team of two faces off against another team in a debate on a predetermined topic, called a resolution. One team is assigned to support the resolution, and the other must negate. These resolutions can range from the topical (the United States should eliminate subsidies for the production of ethanol) to the abstract (mute the red phone) to the downright goofy (Disneyland should succeed from the Union). The topics are announced fifteen minutes before the round begins, and each speaker’s speech must follow strict time limits. A judge decides who wins and assigns points to each speaker based on their performance. Each team debates eight rounds, with the best performing teams graduating to elimination rounds.

The tournament itself was hosted at the United States Air Force academy, and we were treated to a tour of the facility.
Brian Samuelson is a UW senior who will be graduating in May.

Martha Duppler is currently a senior in Political Science.

A Class Trip to Israel

Martha Duppler

At the University of Wisconsin, we are uniquely offered a multitude of choices to individually mold our academic experience. These choices to personalize my education led to an unimaginable opportunity this past spring. My interest in political science has grown into a fascination with Israeli politics, which, in turn, led me to enroll in a seminar addressing Israeli Political Behavior with Professor Ken Goldstein. This seminar, far from the typical power lecture on a Friday morning, was the catalyst to one of the more formative experiences I have been afforded as a student.

Bill Coleman (a Political Science alum) and his wife Marjorie have contributed funds to the Center for Jewish Studies to allow students to learn outside the classroom. Because of this fund, students enrolled in the course were offered the chance to go to Israel for a week at the end of the spring semester and experience first hand the behavior and political complexities we had been studying. Although I cannot overstate how tremendous this experience was for all the students in the class, for me it was a particularly edifying opportunity as it was also my first time leaving the United States.

We prepared for the trip throughout the spring semester by trying to understand the mechanisms at work in Israeli politics. We researched the political cleavages the diverse Israeli populace had produced and unpacked how these divisions interacted with the institutional forces at work in the country. When we left for Israel in May we were armed with our personal understandings of the intricate political and social world we were about to experience. Our trip began in Jerusalem, where we observed the tenuous interactions between different groups we had been studying and were able to finally appreciate the significance of these social cleavages and how they translate into political divisions. This dichotomy was the focus of our trip as we traveled throughout the country and interacted with different people across generational, political and religious boundaries and tried to understand the impetus behind the demographic voting trends we had discussed back in our seminar in the States.

We were able to meet with students, professors, think tank aficionados, and government officials in an attempt to fully appreciate the vast ideological scale at work in Israeli politics. We visited the Knesset and Israeli Supreme Court, saw places where wars had begun, visited the Israeli Holocaust Museum, and stood on the Golan Heights. Building upon our class in Madison with this dynamic empirical knowledge gave us, as students, the chance to fully internalize what we were learning. We were able to see the places and experience the issues upon which people were voting in Israel. We were exposed to the ethos of a country that is young and exponentially different than our own. Most importantly, we were active participants in our own education. Our education transcended geographical and conventional boundaries to immerse us in our subject matter rather than passively observe it from far away. This internalization, this dynamism, is something that I hope all students can experience at one point in their education and I will certainly be traveling back to Israel to continue to pursue it in mine.

Martha Duppler is currently a senior in Political Science.
I was sitting in Political Science Professor David Can- on’s class last October when he made a comment that stuck with me. He pointed out that my generation isn’t protesting against the Iraq War the same way that my parent’s genera- tion protested during the Vietnam era.

The images that came to mind were students clashing with police on Bascom Hill in the 1960’s fading into the im- age of students’ texting and listening to their I-Pods on their way to class. I wanted to explore some of these differences, so I decided to make a documentary comparing the two genera- tional responses to seemingly similar circumstances.

I rounded up ten friends who I thought would have an interesting take on the subject, and together we set out to ex- plore the question: “Is Generation Y (today’s youth) uniquely apathetic?” We put this question in context by comparing student activism today to student activism in the 1960’s. We called it “Youthanized” because we assumed that older gen- erations view our generation as self-absorbed and apathetic.

We began production on “Youthanized” in early February of last year and recently finished part one. We then embarked on the second part of our documentary, which is exploring election issues and technology’s role in engaging young peo- ple in the political process. We have been fortunate enough to speak with people like presidential candidate Rep. Ron Paul, former MTV correspondent Gideon Yago, and author David Maraniss to get their views on our generation’s political activ- ism.

“Youthanized” served as a springboard for the formation of a larger undertaking, the Project Youthanize movement. Project Youthanize is nonpartisan and used a multi-media ap- proach to raise awareness about some of the most pressing social and political issues in the 2008 election and beyond. It’s a three-part project, which began with the documentary but developed into a mini-TV series for the WisconsinEYE network and a website (www.projectyouthanize.org).

Project Youthanize hosted a campus panel with Rep. Tammy Baldwin and five other distinguished panelists on pressing issues in an effort to spark a campus-wide dialogue about these issues. Eventually, we want to broaden our proj- ect to inform young people on a national scale. Our goal is to launch an interactive website to educate youth about some of the most important issues affecting our generation. The Chancellor’s office has provided us with a generous seed grant to jumpstart this effort.

Mark Korshak is currently a senior in Political Science.

Yet the 2008 conventions were simultaneously a reminder of how different one pair of con- ventions can be from another, in just the space of one presidential cycle. So I should also say some- thing about the distinctive ele- ments of the conventions as we watched them unfold this year. Lastly, the 2008 incarnations of- fered several fresh twists that may be harbingers, or just anomalies, in the institutional evolution of the convention.

National party conventions were originally a response to the problem that the drafters of the Constitution did not pro- vide any separate mechanism for nominating presidential can- didates. The Electoral College was intended both to nominate and elect. This arrangement failed almost immediately—the rise of political parties, among other things, was effectively fatal to it—and by the 1830s, national party conventions had been created to deal with the problem. They served as actual decision-making institutions for the next hundred and twenty years, but by the 1950s, more than a half-century ago, the nomination had effectively left the convention, so that the institutions itself was in decline.

The rise of national media of communication, the decline of political parties as field organizations, the expansion of na- tional government into more and more social realms, and the rise of partisan independence within the general public: all served informally to remove the construction of a nominat- ing majority from the convention and place it in the process of delegate selection instead. From the 1950s through the 1980s, the remaining formal activities of the convention, that is, the production of quadrennial reports on rules, credentials, and especially a party platform, still provided means for any remaining candidates to test the dominance of the evident front-runner. But in every case, the apparent nominee sur- vived these tests.

By our time, then, the convention had ceased to be a de- cision-maker of any sort, and had instead become essentially a huge opportunity to introduce its nominee to a wider public and to remind people why they had been (or should become) partisan Democrats or partisan Republicans.

Critics, those who concentrated only on the formal activi-
ties of the convention, derided this result as the mere production of two “infomercials,” as the table below shows.

### The Disappearance of the Multi-Ballot Nomination Battle and the Rise of the Infomercial

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<th>All Nominating Contests</th>
<th>Contests Without Incumbent</th>
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<td>Multi-Ballot</td>
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The television networks shared partially in this critique by cutting back the total amount of convention coverage. To the point where, if you get two speeches per night on your television set, you are having a big convention.

Yet even in this admittedly limited regard, consider how different the conventions of 2004, as a pair, were from the conventions of 2008. In 2004, the Republicans had an incumbent President, and a polarizing one at that, such that 45% of the public would vote for him no matter who the Democratic nominee was, while another 45% would not vote for him, again regardless of the identity of the Democratic nominee. There was little to do with the Republican Convention except emphasize the issues that already advantaged the party, and otherwise think about mobilizing the base. With an unknown nominee, the Democrats had more leeway in theory. But in practice, the campaign of Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts knew that the main issue of the election was going to be national security, and that their main secondary task was to personalize the candidate. The “band of brothers” from the Vietnam War, who featured so prominently at the convention, was the putative solution for doing both.

By contrast, consider the vastly expanded degrees of freedom inherent in presenting the 2008 conventions. Both parties had nominees who were not yet household names. More to the practical point, both nominees had succeeded with a strategy of programmatic ambiguity—the “audacity of hope” versus a “maverick” nature—such that the conventions were both a major threat and a major opportunity. Which is to say: both candidates needed to use their conventions to set out the concerns that would energize their fall campaigns, and potentially put them in the White House. Other things might still be decisive: a better performance in the presidential debates, more powerful campaign ads, or the simple impact of events of the day. Yet the power of their convention messages might also be decisive, and more to the strategic point, an attempt at harnessing this power was largely in their own hands.

So, the respective missions of the two campaigns were at least clear. Barack Obama needed, first, to unify his party. The residual damage of a narrow victory in an extended nominating campaign was still very much with us as the Democratic Convention opened. Simultaneously, Obama needed to unify the Republican Party, that is, to tie John McCain explicitly and firmly to George W. Bush. Beyond that, he needed to define himself, and in two crucial regards. Positively, Obama needed to paint himself as “one of us,” a man who knew and understood the lives and problems of ordinary Americans. Negatively, he needed to underline the differences between himself and John McCain. Nearly everything about the Democratic Convention—certainly all the major speeches—can be read in light of these goals.

From the other side, John McCain had an equally clear, and practically larger, set of requirements for a successful convention. He too needed to create the perception—and ideally, the reality—of party unity. The tensions between McCain and his party were, after all, the bedrock justification for dubbing him a “maverick.” Simultaneously, he needed to detach himself from George W. Bush, a task made more difficult by the fact that he needed to do so without offending those Republicans gathered in the hall itself. Beyond that, he needed to set out the themes of the fall campaign. If McCain was indeed a maverick, then a maverick on what? Lastly, he had the chance, especially because his was the second of these conventions, to attempt to define Barack Obama: as someone who was not “one of us,” as someone who was programatically out of sync with the general public, and/or as someone who was unprepared to be President.

All these things are easier to see at the conventions than in standard televised coverage. But what could one notice there that might not be seen on television at all?

- One thing is the way that the vast array of speeches, almost none of which reach the general public, is crafted to educate the delegates and alternates about partisan talking-points for the fall campaign. Some of these speeches are distinguished and many are dire, but most are developed in full knowledge that they are targeted at the hall, not the electorate.

- Likewise, the vehicles for making these arguments change in ways that are peculiar to a given year. At the Democratic Convention, the comment by John McCain, to the effect that he was not sure how many houses he actually owned, served as a reference point for nearly any argument that the speaker wished to make. At the Republican Convention, the comment by Barack Obama that a position on human life was “above his pay grade” served a similar function.

- A different facet of conventions that is nearly invisible to the viewing public is the vast array of associated meetings that go on outside the hall. Organized groups of all sorts—demographic and cause groups, of course, but also many companies that do business with the government—host events aimed at educating political elites or just knitting them together in the desired fashion.

- Lastly, conventions serve as a window on—or more real-
Mathew D. McCubbins and Norman J. Ornstein / 11

year with major support.”

In any case, there is usually a debate afterward about the impact on public opinion of the conventions—the so-called ‘bounce’ in opinion polls, courtesy of the Democratic and Republican gatherings—and this was made more ambiguous in 2008 by the fact that the conventions were back-to-back and later than usual. In 2004, the Democrats had decided to hold their convention remarkably early, to avoid being challenged by the Olympics as a stimulus to public attention. Afterward, their leadership concluded that this was a disastrous strategy, and, being the out-party, they had the traditional right to go first in 2008, immediately after the Olympics this time. This meant that the Republicans had to hold their convention after Labor Day, the traditional start of the general election campaign. It also meant that the candidate who was behind in national polls, John McCain, lost a potentially critical week of this fall campaign. And it meant that disentangling the public impact of these two back-to-back events was politically contentious, and perhaps analytically hopeless.

On the other hand, two new twists in the evolution of the convention as an institution did surface in 2008. In the first, Barack Obama abandoned the convention hall for his acceptance speech, the key speech of the convention, thereby further reducing the formal substance of the convention program while more or less annihilating the potential consequence of its elected delegates. In the second new twist, John McCain truncated his convention, dumping the planned program and effectively cancelling day number one, thereby providing implicit ammunition to those who had long argued that the entire venture could be radically shortened without any consequential loss.

Whether these developments were in fact harbingers or just anomalies could not be known as this is written. What remained clear (incontrovertible, even) was the place of the convention as our only national, purely partisan, political institution. Indeed, as its formal functions have declined—no more genuine nominations, not even much tactical conflict over the remaining substance—the function of the convention as outlining partisan positions, even partisan identities, for the general public has only grown. If there remains a place for this in American politics (and the vote here is obviously yes), then this is still the place.

Professor Shafer wishes to note that “two friends of the Political Science Department were especially important in facilitating this research. Bob Trice, a Board of Visitors member, helped once again, as he has at every point since I came to Wisconsin. And Phil Prange went above and beyond the call in this particular year with major support.”

- Continued from page 1

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Percent Representation of Women in Single or Lower House Legislatures (1960-2005)

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Source: IPU (2006)

In most of our analysis, quotas, and in particular reserved seats and voluntary party quotas, have a greater impact than do other institutional factors on levels of female legislative representation. Religiosity and countries with predominantly Islamic populations have been said to be at odds with improving women's status in previous studies. Yet when quotas and region are factored into existing models, Islam no longer appears to act as a constraint on women's representation. Numerous predominantly Muslim countries, such as Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, and Indonesia, have adopted quotas, raising rates of female representation in these countries. Similarly, Catholicism loses significance as an explanatory factor when societal attitudes toward egalitarianism are considered.

Quotas play a more important role than do levels of economic development. Some of the poorest countries in the world have some of the highest levels of female representation. Mozambique, Burundi, and Tanzania are among the 15 poorest countries in the world, yet they have among the highest levels of female representation. This too may well represent a change from the past, when quotas were used less frequently in developing countries.

Our study also challenges the view that democratization influences women's representation. While it may influence what women can do in office, we did not find a correlation between level of democracy and women's representation. Earlier research, primarily on Western countries, had suggested that the longer the time since suffrage and the year women were able to run for office, the greater the rates of female representation. With our expanded number of countries we did not find such a correlation. The use of quotas has made these factors less significant.

Our conclusion is that quotas have become an important mechanism through which women today are entering into public office worldwide. They have helped overcome constraints thought to be posed by economic underdevelopment, authoritarianism, religion, and the type of electoral system.

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CAMPAIGNS
IN AUSTRALIA

Ken Mayer

I have never been much of an international traveler, and have great admiration for my colleagues who can go abroad for months or years at a time. My passport, which I had used to wander around Europe for a couple of weeks when I was in my twenties, had lapsed 10 years ago. To my children, “international travel” meant going to California.

So it was a bit of a departure from normal practice when I applied for, and received, the appointment as the inaugural Fulbright-Australian National University Distinguished Chair in American Government, one of about 30 Distinguished Chair appointments worldwide. This was the first Distinguished Chair outside of Europe or the Americas. I had proposed two courses of study: a comparison of the constitutional grants of executive power between Australia and the United States, and an investigation into campaign finance in Australian elections.

The Australian system of government is much like the U.S. in many respects: Australia has a written constitution, a bicameral legislature, a federal structure, and an independent judiciary with the power of judicial review. In other ways, Australia remains a creature of the British tradition, particularly with respect to a parliamentary tradition with an executive government chosen from among legislators, and adherence to the doctrine of responsible government, in which the executive government answers to the House. Elections and campaign finance have a similar character. Elections have become “Americanized,” as political parties spend more and more money in each successive election over the past two decades, with an ever-increasing reliance on television ads to communicate with voters. At the same time, the campaign cycle is short, with only a few weeks of campaigning in between the call for a round of elections and election day itself. And, voting is compulsory: those who don’t cast a ballot face as much as a $50 fine, with jail time for the defiant few who refuse to pay.

These similarities would, I reckoned, give me plenty of opportunities to study and compare government function in both countries. Of course, once I arrived and started my work in earnest, I discovered layer upon layer of subtleties that I could never see from my office; there are some things that don’t transmit well over the web.

For example, the campaign finance system is actually one of the least regulated in the industrialized world. At the federal level there are no contribution limits for federal elections, no source restrictions on contributions, and no expenditure limits. Corporations, labor unions, and foreigners can contribute directly to the political parties, which make nearly all campaign expenditures. In 2004, a British aristocrat made a $1 million contribution to the Liberal Party (which, as it happens, is the conservative party). Disclosure is weak, as parties must disclose only contributions of A$10,000 or more. A savvy contributor could also make additional contributions to the eight state and territory party organizations, resulting in nearly A$90,000, without any disclosure. On expenditures, political parties need only disclose their total spending; there is no itemization.

One immediate consequence of this weak disclosure is that there are only a handful of scholars who study campaign finance, as it is hard to do research when there is so little information. My certainty that there had to be some kind of data floating around among insiders was wrong.

The disruption of my research plans did nothing to diminish the excitement of living halfway around the world. My children went to local public schools, learned about Australian history, and studied Japanese instead of French or Spanish. We traveled across the country, from Perth to Hobart, and Adelaide to Cairns; went scuba diving off the Great Barrier Reef; learned the intricacies of Cricket and Rugby; and reveled in the orderly chaos of Question Time, where the eloquence of the party leaders competes with the often ridiculous behavior of the back-benchers. (One point of order that came up during a session: is it permissible for a member to be listening to his iPod while the Prime Minister is speaking? Answer: no. Members are routinely expelled from the chamber for poor behavior, and the Speaker of the House reminded me of a character from Monty Python. But I digress.)

I was fortunate to return to Canberra in November 2007, as part of an international election observer program run by the Australian Electoral Commission. I am thankful for the contributions to the Political Science Department from alumni that helped fund this trip in part. Election officials from all over the world attended – including Afghanistan and Iraq – and we saw the election occur in real time. It was an historic election, being the first time in Australian history that a Prime Minister lost his seat as well as his majority.

While I cannot yet claim to be as seasoned a traveler as my colleagues, the Fulbright has, as clichéd as it sounds, broadened my horizons. My recent work includes a paper on election administration, and Howard Schweber and I have published two articles in the UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal on Australian constitutional doctrine.
Research in Progress: Monitoring Russian Television News

Scott Gehlbach

In cooperation with the Political Science Department, in particular the Thomas Leonard Wemple Johnson Endowment, the Center for Russia, East Europe, and Central Asia at UW Madison recently launched an exciting new resource for students and scholars of postcommunist Russia: NewsLab Russia, an online digital archive of Russian television news. Part of NewsLab Eurasia, a broader effort to archive the news in post-Soviet states, NewsLab Russia utilizes new technology to make Russian news broadcasts available for analysis and classroom use. In its first year of operation, NewsLab Russia archived the main evening news broadcast on Russia’s three national television networks (NTV, Channel One, and Rossiya) during a period that encompassed the 2007 Duma elections, the nomination of Dmitri Medvedev to succeed Vladimir Putin as president, and the 2008 Russian presidential election.

NewsLab Russia draws on the resources of the University of Wisconsin NewsLab, the exceedingly successful project initiated by my colleague Ken Goldstein to study local U.S. news. Content from Russia is “captured” from satellite feed and stored on servers in Madison, where Russian-speaking undergraduates “clip” the news, dividing broadcasts into segments and attaching category labels to each segment. Through an online searchable archive, now available at www.creeca.wisc.edu/newslabeurasia, anyone with an Internet connection who is willing to abide by basic terms of use has access to broadcasts from all three stations. Thus, for example, a teacher of Russian might search for a news segment on Russian-Ukrainian relations for instructional use, or a scholar might analyze all reports on Chechnya over a one-year period.

The accompanying figure illustrates the sort of analysis that is possible with data from NewsLab Russia. Dmitri Medvedev was one of two likely candidates to succeed Vladimir Putin as president. The other main contender was Sergei Ivanov, a figure who—like Putin—had a background in the security services. Using NewsLab Russia data, we were able to determine whether Medvedev or Ivanov appeared more often on the news, and thus whether one candidate had an edge over the other. The striking fact, as illustrated for the station NTV, is that broadcast time was split nearly equally between the two candidates through the day that Putin nominated Medvedev. (Dots measure the time advantage for Medvedev over Ivanov for individual broadcasts, and the curved line that runs through the center of the graph represents a locally weighted regression, a standard smoothing technique.) The picture is very similar if we look at the other two national television networks.

This parity is even more surprising when one considers that NTV is controlled by state-owned Gazprom, whose chairman at the time was Medvedev. Yet it is explicable when one knows a bit about how decisions on news content are made in Russia. As a Fulbright-Hays Faculty Research Abroad Fellow in Moscow last year, I had the opportunity to speak with numerous media professionals. I was told repeatedly about a “Friday meeting” held in the Kremlin with the heads of the three national television networks, reviewing the previous week’s coverage and planning the next week’s. I also learned that press for Medvedev and Ivanov was handled through the Kremlin press office, rather than at the White House (seat of the Russian government) as their positions would dictate, providing for greater coordination by Putin’s office. And I heard firsthand from the editor of one of the evening news programs that they understood that Medvedev and Ivanov were to receive equal time: if Ivanov was on the news on Tuesday, then Medvedev must appear on Wednesday, regardless of whether he had done anything newsworthy.

The bottom line is that neither Medvedev nor Ivanov were allowed to gain the upper hand until Putin had announced his decision. Once he did, Medvedev surged ahead of Ivanov in news coverage, but a new equal-time norm took hold: Medvedev and Putin now received nearly identical coverage! Medvedev would be Russia’s new president, but he would not surpass Putin in access to the nation’s most powerful political resource. With NewsLab Russia, we could track these developments in real time.

15
As always, Political Science faculty have been deeply engaged in the Wisconsin Idea this year—expanding the University beyond the boundaries of the campus. Faculty provide their expertise frequently in the media, giving talks to groups, and serving as consultants, expert witnesses, and members of special commissions.

Election-related outreach takes other forms as well. Charles Franklin, with his website Pollster.com, and Ken Goldstein, with the Wisconsin Advertising Project site, provide important data that serve as a public resource for reporters, citizens, and scholars. Professors Goldstein and Franklin teamed up to create the Big Ten Battleground Poll, a coordinated effort among most of the Big Ten institutions to conduct two polls in each of the Big Ten states, plus a national sample, and a follow-up poll after the election. We thank former Chancellor John Wiley for providing funding at UW for the polls and for gaining the support of his counterparts around the Big Ten. Board of Visitors member Kathy Lefco provided additional financial help. These polls, plus the UW Political Science/Wispolitics.com Poll conducted in Wisconsin in June (partially funded by Political Science alumni contributions), gained the Department a great deal of favorable publicity.
Obama Outspending McCain 3 to 1 on TV; Nearly 75% of Presidential Ad Spending in Red States

Nearly $38 million spent from October 21-October 28; Another new TV record

Obama spends record amount in week

Both candidates focus on the economy

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Big Ten Battleground Poll

October 23 Big Ten Poll survey results

The second Big Ten poll showed Obama ahead in every Big Ten state, including Indiana, where McCain held a slight edge in September and a Democrat had not won since 1964. Obama also led in Ohio and Pennsylvania, where September's poll results showed the two candidates in a dead heat.

Visit these websites and see more expert analysis at our Election Watch page: www.polisci.wisc.edu/electionwatch.htm
Representation through Taxation: Revenue, Politics, and Development in Postcommunist States

This fall I published Representation through Taxation: Revenue, Politics, and Development in Postcommunist States with Cambridge University Press. An analysis of the political economy of taxation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the book provides answers to three questions: 1) What explains variation in the tax systems that evolved after communism? 2) Who did postcommunist politicians favor in the provision of collective goods and why? 3) What are the consequences of variation in collective goods provision for economic development in postcommunist states?

Taxation was largely an accounting matter under communism, as nearly all means of production were owned by the state. Privatization and liberalization forced postcommunist governments to quickly structure tax systems capable of extracting revenue from private economic actors. For a variety of reasons—distance from Western Europe and the pull of the European Union, inherited industrial structure, and relative poverty at the begin-
ning of transition—the postcommunist states of the former Soviet Union relied on taxation of “old” forms of economic activity, including large, monopolistic firms in resource extraction and other sectors that were relatively easy to tax. In contrast, East European governments cast the revenue net more widely. These tax systems have proved surprisingly durable.

The consequence of this divergence in tax systems is that post-Soviet politicians remain reliant for revenue on the sort of economic activity that characterized communism, and they have disproportionately provided various sorts of collective goods (justice, police protection, and the like) to these industries. This has crowded out small-business activity, by consensus the most important engine for sustainable economic development in postcommunist countries. East European politicians have faced fewer such perverse incentives, and small business has grown under the protection of the state.

The questions raised in my book are classic concerns of comparative political economy. Yet the range of methods I use to answer these questions is relatively unusual in comparative politics. In particular, I rely on mathematical (game theoretic) models to clarify the logic of my argument and generate empirical predictions. I test these predictions statistically, using both cross-national and survey data. At the same time, much of the book uses qualitative evidence from interviews and archive research, and the first chapter is an extended case study of the political economy of vodka taxation in one Russian region. The diversity of methods made it a fun book to write. I hope that it will be similarly interesting to read.

Publicity

The authors analyzed mountains of data, including ad buys, advertising content, voter surveys, and election results, and consistently found that the advertisements that had the most pronounced effect on voters were negative ads.

Goldstein says much of the criticism of negative advertising is rooted in the incorrect notion that the American public is easily manipulated.

“People learn when they see contrasts,” he says. “If it’s white, you don’t see it. If it’s black, you don’t see it. It’s when you see the whole painting that there is some contrast.”

Similarly, Goldstein believes that voters have the ability to intelligently weigh competing claims.

“With negative ads in particular, campaigns have to be very careful about the claims they make because the press puts much more scrutiny on the negative ads,” he says. “If you get an outrageous one, that tends to boomerang on a campaign. You certainly can pick out political ads that honorable people believe have gone over the line, but I trust the people and the political marketplace to take care of that.”

Goldstein, who directs the Wisconsin Advertising Project which tracks and catalogs political ads and which was a major source of the data used in the book, says negative ads are designed to teach, while positive ads many times are designed to play on voters’ emotions.

“Negative ads are more likely to be factually accurate than positive ads. Negative ads are more likely to be on policy than positive ads. Positive ads are a guy walking in khakis walking on the beach with his dog or sitting in front of a fireplace in a fuzzy sweater, and that simply doesn’t have a lot of information,” he says.

Goldstein’s co-authors include Michael Franz, assistant professor of government and legal studies at Bowdoin College; Travis Ridout, assistant professor of political science at Washington State University; and Paul Freedman, associate professor of politics at the University of Virginia. Ridout and Franz earned their doctorates at UW-Madison.

Why does the American electorate pay attention to negative ads? Goldstein thinks the answer is fairly simple.

“It’s for the same reason why when you heard there was a fight behind the school in the seventh grade, you went,” Goldstein says. “There’s such a clutter of political information out there that the negative ad can have the potential to shine though.”

Well-funded national campaigns have the ability to energize voters with the back-and-forth of negative ads, but can be hurt by failing to respond quickly to attacks. That was shown in 2004 when John Kerry was accused by an independent group called Swift Boat Veterans for Truth of inflating his own military record in Vietnam.

“There are many reasons why John Kerry lost in 2004. He didn’t lose because he didn’t have enough money—he actually out-advertised the Bush campaign,” he says. “You can whine about the Swift Boat ad, but the reason it was effective was because the Kerry campaign didn’t respond swiftly, and in fact
The authors’ research shows that negative ads can prompt voters to become more informed on political issues.

“For those people who aren’t getting information from the news, that ad can be a shortcut and cue to go out and search for other information,” Goldstein says. “The 30-second kernel of a political ad isn’t going to feed people’s political knowledge, but if it builds on knowledge they already have or if it encourages them to seek out information in other places, it can be effective.”

What many of the contemporary critics of negative campaign advertising fail to recognize is that negative advertising is a tradition with deep roots in the American political system, he adds.

“To say that American politics, 50 years ago, 60 years ago, 100 years, or 200 years ago was this high-brow debate is just simply wrong,” Goldstein says. “The Declaration of Independence is a negative ad, outlining a bunch of gripes we had with the British. The Lincoln-Douglas debates were negative politics. The major reason Abraham Lincoln did not use negative ads was that TV didn’t exist. If it did exist, he would have.”

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Lisa Martin

International Institutions: Weak Commitments and Signals

See a profile of Professor Martin on page 2.

International politics is increasingly institutionalized. That is, many of the dynamics of international interactions now play out within formalized organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the United Nations Security Council. Many other interactions, such as the annual consultations of the world’s largest economies in the G-7, are regularized sufficiently to be considered institutionalized.

What difference does this institutionalization make? Most scholarly work on international institutions treats them as commitment devices. That is, institutions serve to tie states’ hands so that they are more likely to live up to the terms of international agreements. The WTO, for example, has a complex system of reciprocity and retaliation that allows states to impose sanctions on others if they are found to have violated the terms of WTO commitments.

However, the commitment capacity of international institutions is typically quite modest. The threat of WTO sanctions surely reduces the incidence of trade protection, but the size of these sanctions is in no way sufficient to explain the massive movement toward free trade observed in the last decades. In other instances, such as military alliances, no explicit sanctioning provisions exist, and the threat of sanctions would likely lack credibility. Given the limited sanctioning power of international institutions, it seems that they should be considered only weak commitment devices. That is, they may be sufficient to encourage good behavior for small, relatively needy states, or for larger states that face only minor temptations to cheat on agreements. But it is not plausible that the commitment capacities of institutions are sufficient to tie the hands of states that anticipate large benefits from such cheating.

What alternative functions might institutions play? One prominent possibility is that they could provide signals about state intentions, either instead of or in addition to providing commitments. If it is costly for states to join institutions, and if the cost structure differentiates between states that intend to live up to their commitments and those that are likely to renege, then institutions could effectively screen between these two types of states. That is, rather than (or in addition to) providing ex post binding power, international institutions could provide ex ante information about likely behavior in the future.

Is this signaling model of institutions plausible? Initial empirical investigation suggests that this new perspective could substantially shift and deepen our understanding of how institutions function. For institutions to serve as effective signals, membership in them must be a costly endeavor. Perhaps the most striking example of this dynamic takes place within the European Union (EU). The EU offers enormous benefits to its members, and existing members are anxious that entrants will not grab these benefits while failing to live up to EU expectations. The EU therefore forces potential entrants to undergo a grueling accession process. Pre-membership negotiations go on for years, and potential new members must undertake extensive domestic reforms before the EU commits to allowing them to join. These reforms will be less costly for genuinely reformist governments to undertake than those that are more reluctant, so that the cost structure is appropriate for the EU to serve a substantial signaling function. More systematic research on the signaling properties of institutions, and how they can be designed to be more effective signals, will provide insight into the role of institutions in our globalized world.

Howard Schweber

The Language of Liberal Constitutionalism

My book grows out of my interest in the intersection between constitutional and political theory. For decades, liberal political theorists, legal philosophers, and sociological writers have debated the implications of a constitutional form of government—and particularly American constitutional government—for the question of political legitimacy in a democratic system. The basic pattern for exploring these issues
was defined by Alexander Bickel’s classic description of the “counter-majoritarian problem”: in a democratic system that makes the consent of the governed the basic test for legitimate government, how can we explain or justify the idea of a written constitution that appears to limit the choices available to citizens through the political process? To a legal philosopher, this points to the questions of whether we can or should distinguish the content of laws from their source when we ask what constitutes a valid law. To a sociologist, the question is what the relationship between legal and norms must be if a system of law is to be accepted as legitimate by the people who live under its rules.

In this book, I essentially reversed the order of the questions. Instead of asking how constitutional guarantees of rights and limits on government power can be justified in a democracy, I asked what would have to be true in order for such a project of justification to be possible. In the book, I proposed that this inquiry leads to two simple-sounding but potentially difficult questions: First, given a commitment to democratic self-rule and widespread disagreements of questions of value, how is the creation of a legitimate constitutional regime possible? Second, what must be true about a constitution if the regime that it supports is to retain its claim to legitimacy?

In attempting to answer these questions, I found myself focusing on the particular role that language plays in a constitutional democracy. Essentially, my answer to the first question is that the creation of a legitimate constitution depends on a prior commitment by all involved to create a special way of speaking about those subjects that are to be identified as “constitutional.” This proposition can be stated in classic liberal terms: before we can agree to a social contract, we have to agree to a language in which to express its terms. Applied to the particular question of constitutional creation, the argument becomes somewhat more complicated. For one thing, I argued that the case for a commitment to a common language is far stronger and more specific in the context of constitutionalism than in general discussions of liberal democracy. For another, I argued that what is required is a commitment to a specialized, “constitutional” language that is the condition of possibility for creating a legitimate constitution. Viewed this way, the constitutional text becomes a kind of primer for a specialized form of discourse, in addition to its other important functions.

In responding to the second question, I moved beyond the abstract consideration of constitutional language embodied in a constitutional text to a set of more specific questions concerning what such a language has to look like. I argued that the language of constitutionalism must be separate from both ordinary political and legal language, that it must be “incomplete” in the sense of not presupposing particular outcomes to concrete questions, and that it must contain sufficient “substance” that the constitutional text has a strong connection to the social and political values of the society it is intended to serve. The implications of this argument are far-reaching, and in some ways potentially disturbing. The insistence that the adoption of a constitutional text necessarily reflects a commitment to constitutional language suggests the limits of the kinds of pluralism that multicultural, postmodern, and other critics of the liberal tradition embrace. The implication is that a constitution is, indeed, exclusionary: the adoption of a constitutional language means that certain kinds of claims will be more easily “translated” into constitutional arguments than others. Conversely, the commitment to language implies a degree of indeterminacy that questions the validity of the usual debates about constitutional interpretation: frequently there will be no single “right answer” to what a constitution requires, only a set of rules that govern the ways in which we argue about different outcomes. My hope is that although this is a highly theoretical work, it has significant implications for the way we talk about constitutions and constitutional law in practice.

This book analyses the impact of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (the first school voucher program in American history) on public schools in Milwaukee. The voucher program began in 1991 with 341 students enrolled in private schools using publicly funded vouchers. It has subsequently grown to over 18,000 students. Considerable research, much of which I have done with the help of Political Science graduate students, has focused on comparisons of the relative educational outcomes of voucher students and students remaining in the public schools. An ongoing five-year longitudinal study of those effects is currently underway.

This book looks at a different question. It asks: what are the effects of the voucher program on the public schools in Milwaukee? The theoretical basis for this empirical study is the proposition that private-school vouchers will produce a competitive effect that will induce the traditional public schools to become better. Subsequent research on Milwaukee and elsewhere has been mixed on this hypothesis, but several very highly cited studies of Milwaukee found positive effects in terms of increased achievement test scores for public schools following the introduction of vouchers. Thus the effects of competition in education are of great interest to social science researchers and policymakers.

We studied these potential effects in two ways. The first compares test scores of a variety of school types in Milwaukee from 1996 to 2004 with comparable schools outside Milwaukee. This study hinges on a large expansion of the voucher program following a favorable court ruling allowing religious private schools into the program. The basic idea is that if there should be competitive pressures from this exodus to private
schools in Milwaukee but not in the comparable districts that do not have vouchers. As with earlier research, we found Milwaukee test scores did indeed increase relative to schools in other districts in the two years following that expansion in the 1997-98 school year. However, while other studies stopped with those years, we looked past the 1999-00 school year. During the period from 2000-01 to 2004-05, when voucher use was expanding even more, the scores in traditional public schools declined somewhat and leveled off relative to schools in other districts. Thus it appeared that the increases were short lived.

The second study analyzed the direct competitive pressures that would work on schools directly affected by voucher competition. We did this in two ways. First we calculated the voucher-school “density” surrounding each traditional public school based on distance measures between the schools and the number of voucher schools within specified distances. We also looked directly at enrollment declines of public schools and their subsequent effect on test scores. Finally, we included not only voucher schools but also publicly created charter schools as potential competitors for traditional public schools. Almost all of the results were insignificant; i.e. there was no significant competitive response by traditional public schools. Voucher school density had no effect in any grade or subject in which tests were available. The same non-results held for high-proportion African American public schools. The only effects, which did not hold for all grades or tests, were modest competitive increases in traditional public schools near charter schools.

The relatively modest evidence of competitive effects of educational choices was qualified to a degree by noting that Milwaukee remains without doubt the leading district in the nation in terms of the choices between schools it offers families and students. What that meant for this study was that it might be hard to isolate the effects of specific programs and variables in a choice market that includes vouchers, charters, magnet schools, and open enrollment programs that provide for choices to attend schools outside of Milwaukee.

John Zumbrunnen

Silence and Democracy: Athenian Politics in Thucydides’ History

See a profile of Professor Zumbrunnen on page 2.

This summer, Pennsylvania State University Press published my book, Silence and Democracy: Athenian Politics in Thucydides’ History. The book explores the relevance of Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War to our contemporary thinking about democracy, particularly under the strain of war. Thucydides’ history of the conflict between Athens and Sparta—a conflict that spanned the last three decades of the fifth century, B.C.—has had remarkable staying power. During the Cold War, many turned to the History as a compelling analysis of a bipolar world. More recently, Thucydides has from time to time figured in arguments about the war in Iraq. Some, for example, find in Thucydides’ account of the ultimately disastrous Athenian expedition to Sicily a relevant warning about imperial hubris. Others see in his emphasis on the Athenians’ failure fully to support the expedition a timely reminder of the importance of ‘staying the course.’

Most such appropriations of Thucydides focus on the words and deeds of the handful of political elites who appear by name in the History. My aim has been to explore Thucydides’ understanding of the interaction of those elites with the mass of ordinary citizens who for the most part remain silent, listening and from time to time deciding what course of action the city will take. What, I ask, are we to make of this sort of ambiguously democratic politics, which as it speaks in the History bears more than a passing similarity to what passes for democracy in our own time? What, more particularly, are we to make of the silence of the people, the demos, in this sort of politics? Does it simply mark the domination of politics by a relative view, rendering democracy meaningless?

Drawing on an exploration of the thematic significance of silence throughout the History, I conclude, rather counter-intuitively, that a properly engaged sort of silence on the part of ordinary citizens works at times not to enable but rather to destabilize elite domination. Thucydides’ vocal Athenian political actors try to get and keep political influence by using words to control the meaning of Athenian identity and Athenian actions. The very silence of the demos, though, makes the mass of ordinary citizens in a sense unknowable. Try though they might, elites in Thucydides’ account cannot know the precise impact of their words on the demos, either before or after they speak. As a result, the influence of any particular political actor will be fragile and momentary, and any sort of control over the meaning of Athens will be tenuous at best.

This is not, of course, to suggest that silence on the part of the people is a recipe for successful democracy. A properly engaged silence may serve to destabilize elite domination. But on my reading Thucydides also makes clear the dangerous consequences of utter silence in the city, of the complete absence of contending voices in the political arena. In the History, the Athenians all too often fall completely silent, acting with no consideration whatsoever of the meaning of their deeds. In the end, Thucydides presents democracy as a delicate balance of speech and silence, of elite attempts to control and mostly silent resistance on the part of ordinary citizens.

In my current work, I’ve turned from Thucydides’ brand of history to Aristophanes often ribald comedy. Aristophanes makes ordinary citizens the heroes and heroines of his comedies. That is, while Thucydides’ thematizes the silence of ordinary citizens in theoretically interesting ways, Aristophanes makes ordinary citizens speak. With my reading of the History as a backdrop, my work on Aristophanes aims to bring his vivid portrayals of very vocal ordinary citizens struggling against political, economic and social elites into contact with various controversies in contemporary democratic theory.
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